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European Union Politics
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Dynamic Representation

The Case of European Integration

Hermann Schmitt

MZES, University of Mannheim, Germany

Jacques J. A. Thomassen

University of Twente, The Netherlands

This article asks two questions: first, why are party voters less favourable towards specific EU policies than party elites?; second, how does political representation of EU preferences actually work, is it an elite- or a mass-driven process? The data-sets of the European Election Studies 1979 and 1994 are analysed which involve both an elite and a mass survey component. In contrast to earlier research, it appears that political representation of EU preferences works rather well regarding the grand directions of policy making, and that party elites behave responsively in view of changing EU preferences among their voters.

Key Words: public opinion • political representation • electoral behaviour • democratic deficit

European Union Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3, 318-339 (2000)
DOI: 10.1177/1465116500001003003
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