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Just a Lobbyist?

The European Parliament and the Consultation Procedure

University of A Coruña, Spain, dvarela{at}udc.es

The role of the European Parliament (EP) under the consultation procedure has been widely neglected by rational choice models of legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU). This paper offers a new understanding of the procedure by means of a computational model in which lobbyists provide legislators with policy options. Transaction costs of assimilating information lead to rationing of access to the agenda-setter (i.e. the Commission). In this context, consultation converts the EP into an indirect channel to the agenda-setter for some lobbyists. I argue that the resulting pool of policy options, together with the right to be heard by the Commission and the latter's degree of rational ignorance, provides the EP with a legislative power that the literature has not so far recognized. The implications of this finding extend to other legislative procedures of the EU and to consultative committees in other political systems.

Key Words: bargaining • computer simulation • European Parliament • institutional affairs • legislative studies • rational choice

European Union Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1, 7-34 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1465116508099759


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