This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Kasack, C. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                   What's this?

The Legislative Impact of the European Parliament Under the Revised Co-Decision Procedure

Environmental, Public Health and Consumer Protection Policies

University of Hamburg, Germany christiane.kasack{at}gmx.de

This study analyses the legislative impact of the European Parliament (EP) under the revised co-decision procedure. I develop a model with adoption by Council and Commission as dependent variables and relative amendment importance, time of adoption, the amendment’s position in the legislation and internal parliamentary unity as independent variables. The results of my logistic regression question the common expectation that Co-decision II has increased the EP’s power. On the contrary, the rate of amendment adoption remains unchanged. The Commission’s influence during the second reading has, however, diminished. Furthermore, the study shows that the chance of an amendment made in the first reading being reintroduced increases in line with its adoption by the Commission and its non-adoption by the Council.

Key Words: co-decision • environmental policies • European Parliament • legislative procedures • Treaty of Amsterdam

CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				B. Hoyland Allocation of Codecision Reports in the Fifth European Parliament European Union Politics, March 1, 2006; 7(1): 30 - 50. [Abstract] [PDF]