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European Union Politics
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Do Membership Benefits Buy Regulatory Compliance?

An Empirical Analysis of EU Directives 1978—99

Richard Perkins

London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, r.m.perkins{at}lse.ac.uk

Eric Neumayer

London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, e.neumayer{at}lse.ac.uk

Underlying several theories of European integration is the idea that countries' willingness to sign up to supranational rules is dependent on the expectation and/or realization of various benefits. In this paper, we explore whether such benefits also affect member states' implementation of these rules. Using econometric techniques, we estimate the influence of several measures of membership benefits on the annual number of legal infringements received by 15 member states over the period from 1978 to 1999. Our results provide qualified support for the idea that benefits positively influence compliance. We find that greater intra-EU trade dependence and voting power in European institutions relative to population size are negatively associated with legal infringements. Yet, contrary to a priori expectations, net fiscal transfers are positively correlated with infringements.

Key Words: compliance • European integration • implementation • membership benefits

European Union Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2, 180-206 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1465116507076429
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