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Who Calls for a Common EU Foreign Policy?

Partisan Constraints on CFSP Reform

University of Iowa, USA, Christian-Jensen{at}uiowa.edu

Jonathan Slapin, PhD

University of California, Los Angeles, USA, jslapin{at}ucla.edu

Thomas König

University of Mannheim, Germany, tkoenig{at}dhv-speyer.de

What drove the preferences over institutional choices of EU Constitutional Convention delegates in the area of foreign policy? We examine delegate preferences and find strong evidence that partisan identity rather than government positions drove delegates' preferences for both the role of the Commission and the voting rule in the Council. We also find evidence that delegates' party positions on an EU foreign policy are better predictors than delegates' personal preferences of their preferred role for the Commission and the voting rule in the Council. If government and national interests would dominate any policy area, it would be foreign policy. We contend that our finding in this critical case underscores the importance of partisan effects in European integration.

Key Words: common foreign policy

European Union Politics, Vol. 8, No. 3, 387-410 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1465116507079547


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