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The Social Choice of EU Treaties

Discrepancies between Voter Preferences and Referendum Outcomes in Denmark

University of Southern Denmark, Denmark, mju{at}sam.sdu.dk

The article applies Social Choice theory to analyse new and so far undiscovered aspects of the Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 1993. The article queries whether the amended Maastricht Treaty adopted in 1993 was, in fact, the most preferred alternative for a majority of Danish voters. A reconstruction of voter preferences regarding the political alternatives in the European Union — the Maastricht Treaty, the amended Maastricht Treaty and the Status Quo — reveals that the amended Maastricht Treaty, despite the fact that it was the Condorcet winner and won the 1993 referendum, may not have been preferred by a majority but was probably the most preferred alternative only for a minority of the electorate.

Key Words: Maastricht Treaty • referendum • social choice • voting

European Union Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4, 537-553 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1465116507082813


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