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Legislative Bargaining in the European Union

The Divide between Large and Small Member States

University of Victoria, Canada, schure{at}uvic.ca

Amy Verdun

University of Victoria, Canada, averdun{at}uvic.ca

We analyse legislative bargaining in the European Union. In our model, EU member states bargain over the policy choices underlying legislation and over its `template': (1) the degree of discretion at the application stage, and (2) whether the discretionary power is delegated to the Commission (or retained by the Council). Our analysis classifies member states into `large', `medium-sized' and `small' based on their voting power in the Council. Large member states seek to adopt open-ended legislation in which the Council retains the discretionary power. Medium-sized ones prefer `clear rules' without discretion. Small member states prefer open-ended legislation in which discretion is delegated to the Commission. We discuss the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as an illustrative example.

Key Words: delegation • EU governance • legislative bargaining • small states • Stability and Growth Pact

European Union Politics, Vol. 9, No. 4, 459-486 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/1465116508095146


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