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Mobilizing Bias in Europe

Lobbies, Democracy and EU Health Policy-Making

University of Michigan, USA, slgreer{at}umich.edu

Elize Massard da Fonseca

University of Edinburgh, UK, e.m.fonseca{at}sms.ed.ac.uk

Christopher Adolph

University of Washington, Seattle, USA, cadolph{at}u.washington.edu

What effects do interest groups have on the democratization and legitimacy of the European Union (EU)? Interest groups can democratize the EU only to the extent that they do not replicate inequalities. We use a newly constructed database to look for inequalities: Are the big organizations in Brussels the same as the ones in the EU member states? Are some member states' lobbies more active than others? And does the structure of EU lobbying create insiders and outsiders itself? We find representative biases in favor of powerful incumbents, groups from some member states and wellresourced groups.

Key Words: European Union • health policy • interest groups • lobbying

European Union Politics, Vol. 9, No. 3, 403-433 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/1465116508093491


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