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<title>European Union Politics current issue</title>
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<prism:coverDisplayDate>December 2009</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:publicationName>European Union Politics</prism:publicationName>
<prism:issn>1465-1165</prism:issn>
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<title>European Union Politics</title>
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<title><![CDATA[Social Nation and Social Europe: Support for National and Supranational Welfare Compensation in Europe]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/427?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article investigates citizen support for welfare provisions, where these can be provided at both the national and the EU level. The guiding question is whether welfare provisions at one level dampen, increase or have little effect on support for assistance at the other level. Analysis of data on support for national and EU-level welfare assistance suggests only one-way tension between governance levels: generous national welfare may modestly diminish support for EU-level welfare assistance, as well as the degree to which economic insecurities encourage such support; but the currently meagre EU-level Structural Funds and other transfers have little effect on support for national compensation. This analysis clarifies the possibilities and dilemmas of welfare compensation where governance is multi-level in character.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Burgoon, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:04:59 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116509346381</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Social Nation and Social Europe: Support for National and Supranational Welfare Compensation in Europe]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>10</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>455</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>427</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[A Two-Level Analysis of the Determinants of Direct Democratic Choices in European, Immigration and Foreign Policy in Switzerland]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/456?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article employs a unique data set &mdash; covering 25 popular votes on foreign, European and immigration/asylum policy held between 1992 and 2006 in Switzerland &mdash; in order to examine the conditional impact of context upon utilitarian, cultural, political and cognitive determinants of individual attitudes toward international openness. Our results reveal clear patterns of cross-level interactions between individual determinants and the project-related context of the vote. Thus, although party cues and political competence have a strong impact on individuals&rsquo; support for international openness, this impact is substantially mediated by the type of coalition that is operating within the party elite. Similarly, subjective utilitarian and cultural considerations influence the voters&rsquo; decision in interaction with the content of the proposal submitted to the voters as well as with the framing of the voting campaign.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sciarini, P., Tresch, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:04:59 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116509346388</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[A Two-Level Analysis of the Determinants of Direct Democratic Choices in European, Immigration and Foreign Policy in Switzerland]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>10</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>481</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>456</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/482?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Domestic Politics and European Treaty Reform: Understanding the Dynamics of Governmental Position-Taking]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/482?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article analyses the extent to which governmental positions on European integration originate from domestic politics. In contrast to previous studies, I apply a longitudinal research design that allows for an empirical analysis of the domestic dynamics that govern position formation. I use advanced statistical measurement techniques to compare national positions across time. Member states&rsquo; economic characteristics define a corridor for governmental positions. However, the political dynamics of the domestic arena determine the final position governments adopt at any particular Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). In particular, when formulating the national position, the short-term trend in public opinion limits governmental discretion. This effect is especially strong if the government announced ratification by referendum and in countries with a system of strong parliamentary scrutiny.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Finke, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:04:59 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116509346385</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Domestic Politics and European Treaty Reform: Understanding the Dynamics of Governmental Position-Taking]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>10</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>506</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>482</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/507?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Why Don't Veto Players Use Their Power?]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/507?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after additional veto players, such as new member states or the European Parliament, have increased the constraints on policy change by legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU)? To answer these questions, this study investigates the voting preferences and logrolling opportunities of the member states on 48 Commission proposals. We find that models that derive the voting preferences from each Commission initiative are scarcely able to explain the consensus in the Council. One reason is that the Commission attempts to avoid a divided Council by initiating proposals for which member states favour a policy change in the same direction. When member states still dispute the size of policy change, we show that they can find a solution by mutually benefiting from logrolling across proposals that either belong to the same policy domain or are negotiated during the same period. Hence, intertemporal and domain-specific logrolling can provide a powerful explanation for consensus even in a contested Council.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Konig, T., Junge, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:04:59 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116509346780</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Why Don't Veto Players Use Their Power?]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>10</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>534</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>507</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/535?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Measuring Interest Group Influence Using Quantitative Text Analysis]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/535?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The analysis of interest group influence is crucial in order to explain policy outcomes and to assess the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. However, owing to methodological difficulties in operationalizing influence, only few have studied it. This article therefore proposes a new approach to the measurement of influence, drawing on quantitative text analysis. By comparing interest groups&rsquo; policy positions with the final policy output, one can draw conclusions about the winners and losers of the decision-making process. In order to examine the applicability of text analysis, a case study is presented comparing hand-coding, <I>WORDSCORES</I> and <I>Wordfish</I>. The results correlate highly and text analysis proves to be a powerful tool to measure interest groups&rsquo; policy positions, paving the way for the large-scale analysis of interest group influence.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kluver, H.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:04:59 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116509346782</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Measuring Interest Group Influence Using Quantitative Text Analysis]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>10</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>549</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>535</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/550?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Sociology of the European Union: An Agenda]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/550?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>We seek to shape an agenda for the growing interest in using sociological approaches to study the European Union (EU). In order to deepen and broaden the Europeanization agenda, the article points to how sociology can help reveal the &lsquo;social bases&rsquo; of European integration (i.e. processes of European Union), as well as identify effects on European society that might reconnect EU studies with key comparative political economy debates about the European &lsquo;varieties of capitalism&rsquo; and its models of economy and society. Unfortunately, however, &lsquo;sociological&rsquo; approaches towards the EU have mostly been wrongly equated with the &lsquo;constructivist turn&rsquo; in EU studies, and its characteristic preference for &lsquo;soft&rsquo; qualitative discursive methods and meta-theory. We argue that, rather than turning to culture, identity or social theory for inspiration, an empirical sociological approach to the EU would reintroduce social structural questions of class, inequality, networks and mobility, as well as link up with existing approaches to public opinion, mobilization and claims-making in the political sociology of the EU. To conclude, the article identifies some exemplary studies along these lines.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Favell, A., Guiraudon, V.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:04:59 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116509346384</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Sociology of the European Union: An Agenda]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>10</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>576</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>550</prism:startingPage>
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