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<title><![CDATA[The Council Presidency: Power Broker or Burden? An Empirical Analysis]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/315?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The potential impact of the EU Council Presidency on legislative decision-making has been frequently identified. This article provides an empirical analysis of the Presidency's influence on decision outcomes based on a large-n data set. Two counterfactuals are used to represent consensual decision-making and hard bargaining in the Council. The role of supranational actors is controlled for directly. The findings show that a member state benefits from holding the Presidency during the final stages of the legislative proceedings. Besides the support of supranational actors, the regression analysis controls for the voting threshold, the type of proposal and salience.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Warntjen, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116508093487</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Council Presidency: Power Broker or Burden? An Empirical Analysis]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>338</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>315</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/339?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Does European Citizenship Increase Tolerance in Young People?]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/339?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>While Europe is celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Rome Treaty, there is much doubt about the extent of citizens' emotional attachment to Europe. In this article we examine whether young Belgians show a sense of European citizenship, using a range of questions about the European Union (EU) from a survey administered to more than 6000 secondary school students. We show that a genuine identification with Europe &mdash; one that is not purely based on a positive evaluation of the EU from a utilitarian point of view &mdash; is related to higher levels of tolerance towards ethnic minorities, Muslims and immigrants. In addition, we will provide an overview of the literature on European citizenship and its potential connection to a higher degree of tolerance towards different cultures.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Quintelier, E., Dejaeghere, Y.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116508093488</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Does European Citizenship Increase Tolerance in Young People?]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>362</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>339</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/363?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Determinants of Support for European Integration: The Case of Bulgaria]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/363?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The electorate's ability to influence the European agenda through European elections and national referenda has led to a close inspection of public attitudes by both academics and politicians. Taking a micro-level approach, this article contributes to the larger literature on the formation of public attitudes and aims at identifying the factors that influence public attitudes towards European integration in Bulgaria, one of the new member states. We use a national survey and rely upon utilitarian, value-based and heuristic factors to test several hypotheses. Although our data confirm the argument that support is higher in countries with lower opportunity costs of transferring sovereignty to the European Union, we also find that EU membership is assessed by projecting potential benefits for future generations rather than self-centered expectations of immediate returns.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tanasoiu, C., Colonescu, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116508093489</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Determinants of Support for European Integration: The Case of Bulgaria]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>377</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>363</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/379?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Embracing European Law: Compliance with EU Directives in Central and Eastern Europe]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/379?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Accession to the European Union (EU) demands the adoption of a vast body of legislation. This paper analyses compliance with EU directives in eight post-communist countries during the Eastern enlargement and tries to account for the puzzling embrace of EU law in Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on a new data set tracking the transposition of a sample of 119 directives, the paper finds effects of both political preferences and government capacity on the likelihood of timely transposition. Furthermore, important sectoral differences are uncovered, with trade-related legislation having a better chance and environmental legislation having a significantly worse chance of being incorporated into national legal systems on time. Beyond the conditionality of the accession process, the paper unveils a complex causal structure behind the ups and downs in transposition performance.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Toshkov, D.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116508093490</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Embracing European Law: Compliance with EU Directives in Central and Eastern Europe]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>402</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>379</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/403?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Mobilizing Bias in Europe: Lobbies, Democracy and EU Health Policy-Making]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/403?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>What effects do interest groups have on the democratization and legitimacy of the European Union (EU)? Interest groups can democratize the EU only to the extent that they do not replicate inequalities. We use a newly constructed database to look for inequalities: Are the big organizations in Brussels the same as the ones in the EU member states? Are some member states' lobbies more active than others? And does the structure of EU lobbying create insiders and outsiders itself? We find representative biases in favor of powerful incumbents, groups from some member states and wellresourced groups.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Greer, S. L., da Fonseca, E. M., Adolph, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116508093491</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Mobilizing Bias in Europe: Lobbies, Democracy and EU Health Policy-Making]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>433</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>403</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/435?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Forum Section: The Two Faces of Framing: Individual-Level Framing and Collective Issue Definition in the European Union]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/435?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Policy decisions are greatly affected by the way issues are understood collectively by policy-makers and the public. Naturally, advocates attempt to affect these dynamics by drawing attention to one dimension or another. Lobbyists outside government, such as political leaders and civil servants within governing institutions, try to spin or frame the issues on which they work. Research on framing is difficult, however, because of a methodological complication: no individual actor single-handedly determines how issues are defined collectively. The collective dynamics of agenda-setting and framing are subject to strong competitive forces, maintaining a stable equilibrium at most times, but also to threshold effects that can occasionally lead to rapid shifts in issue definitions. Research strategies used to study one face of framing (at the individual level) are ill suited to study the second face of framing (aggregate shifts in collective issue definitions). We discuss the two faces of framing as they relate to recent literature on policy-making in the European Union and we suggest some avenues for future research.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Baumgartner, F. R., Mahoney, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-08-11</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116508093492</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Forum Section: The Two Faces of Framing: Individual-Level Framing and Collective Issue Definition in the European Union]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>449</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-09-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>435</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/187?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/187?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>How effective and relevant is European Union political conditionality for the promotion of democracy in third countries? This article reports the results of a panel study of 36 countries of the East European and Mediterranean neighbourhood of the EU for the years 1988&mdash;2004. The analysis shows robust and strong effects of EU political conditionality on democracy in the neighbouring countries if the EU offers a membership perspective in return for political reform. Absent the offer of membership, however, EU incentives such as partnership and cooperation do not reliably promote democratic change. The analysis controls for economic development and transnational exchanges as two alternative potential causes of democratization. Although economic and geographical factors have an impact on democratization in the European neighbourhood as well, EU political conditionality remains a significant influence.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Schimmelfennig, F., Scholtz, H.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-05-27</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116508089085</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>215</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>187</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/217?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Attitudes toward Eliminating Income Inequality in Europe]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/217?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In this paper, we seek to understand why attitudes vary among individuals regarding the issue of income distribution in European Union member states. We believe that the issue of income inequality is a potentially significant political cleavage that may have an important influence in meaningful ways in European politics. Rather than focusing on the national context to explain variation in citizen attitudes toward income inequality, we control for national context and explore the relative influence of various individual-level characteristics in shaping how Europeans think about the distribution of income in their countries. We assess how individuals' political attitude, economic self-interest, and general attitude toward society affect how they think about income equality in their own society. To test these propositions, we devise a series of hypotheses that are tested in an ordered probit model using data from the 2000&mdash;1 wave of the World Values and European Values Surveys. It is our contention that the way people think about income inequality in their society is largely a product of the ideas that they hold about politics and society, and not principally a product of their economic self-interest.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kaltenthaler, K., Ceccoli, S., Gelleny, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-05-27</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116508089086</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Attitudes toward Eliminating Income Inequality in Europe]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>241</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>217</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/243?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Shifting Europe's Boundaries: Mass Media, Public Opinion and the Enlargement of the EU]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/243?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article demonstrates that public attitudes towards EU enlargement are strongly affected by exposure to the mass media. It reveals `priming' effects by showing that media exposure affects the standards by which individuals evaluate the accession of potential candidate countries. To gain a more refined understanding about media effects on enlargement attitudes, we analytically separate three different factors that underlie EU enlargement support for a given candidate country: its economic performance, its state of democracy and its perceived cultural `match' with the EU. Employing an experimental design, we probe the media-induced effects of these factors on EU enlargement attitudes.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Maier, J., Rittberger, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-05-27</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116508089087</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Shifting Europe's Boundaries: Mass Media, Public Opinion and the Enlargement of the EU]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>267</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>243</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/269?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Drivers and Brakemen: State Decisions on the Road to European Integration]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/269?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article investigates the effect of public opinion, ideology, and political security on state decision-making on economic integration within the European Union (EU). Although leaders may have objective preferences based on projected economic effects and party ideology, they often face domestic constituencies with different views on increasing European interdependence. I argue that leaders with higher political security are able to discount adverse public opinion and to pursue their own preferences. Where leaders feel their political life may be in jeopardy, they stake out positions closer to prevailing public opinion. I test this hypothesis using a series of ordered probit models, and I conclude that even modest gains in political security dramatically increase the likelihood of a leader pushing strongly for economic integration.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nguyen, E. S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-05-27</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116508089088</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Drivers and Brakemen: State Decisions on the Road to European Integration]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>293</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>269</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/2/295?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Last Words on Delegation?: Examining The Powers of the Union]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/2/295?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mastenbroek, E., Veen, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-05-27</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116508089089</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Last Words on Delegation?: Examining The Powers of the Union]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>311</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-06-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>295</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/5?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional Evaluations: Explaining Public Opinion on Common European Policies in Foreign Affairs and                 Defence]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/5?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This paper addresses public opinion on common European policies in foreign affairs                 and defence. It proposes three models of support for common policies in these                 fields. Drawing on Eurobarometer data, the analysis shows that instrumental                 self-interest and territorial identities contribute considerably to explaining                 support for common foreign affairs and defence policies. Moreover, support for                 common policies is strongly driven by domain-specific evaluations of the European                 Union's performance. These findings suggest that popular support for common European                 policies in foreign affairs and defence has an experiential base. Thus, elites have                 an incentive to respond to public opinion when making policy decisions, so this                 analysis supports the liberal view in international relations rather than the                 realist account.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Schoen, H.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507085955</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Identity, Instrumental Self-Interest and Institutional Evaluations: Explaining Public Opinion on Common European Policies in Foreign Affairs and                 Defence]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>29</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>5</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/31?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Structure of Conflict over EU Chemicals Policy]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/31?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>There is a lively academic debate over whether political cleavages in the European                 Union (EU) follow mainly territorial (national) or non-territorial (ideological)                 patterns. This article analyses the cleavages that structure the conflict over                 European chemicals policy, the so-called REACH system. Taking positions on this                 major policy as an empirical example, we test these competing theories on the nature                 of cleavages on environmental policy issues in the EU. We use data from an expert                 survey of more than 600 individuals to fulfil this aim. The results show that                 neither of the hypotheses is unequivocally supported. But the data indicate that                 cleavages based on non-territorial interests are much more important than                 territorial interests in explaining positions on REACH.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lindgren, K.-O., Persson, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507085956</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Structure of Conflict over EU Chemicals Policy]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>58</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>31</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/59?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Regarding the Dutch `Nee' to the European Constitution: A Test of the Identity, Utilitarian and Political Approaches to Voting `No']]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/59?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In June 2005, 61.5% of the Dutch voted `nee' in the referendum on the European                 constitution. In the present contribution I test hypotheses from the national                 identity, utilitarian and political approaches to explain this voting behaviour. I                 collected data in the Netherlands to test whether one of those approaches has been                 decisive in explaining the referendum outcome. I also provide information about                 whether specific EU evaluations from these approaches explain the voting behaviour,                 thus bringing in the discussion on the importance of domestic political evaluations                 (second-order election effects). I also test hypotheses on which theoretical                 approach explains differences between social categories in rejecting the                 constitution. My results show that specifically EU evaluations in particular                 accounted for the `no' vote, although in conjunction with a strong effect from                 domestic political evaluations. I also find evidence for `party-following behaviour'                 irrespective of people's attitudes. Utilitarian explanations determine the `no' vote                 less well than political or national identity explanations. The strongest impact on                 voting 'no' came from a perceived threat from the EU to Dutch culture.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lubbers, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507085957</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Regarding the Dutch `Nee' to the European Constitution: A Test of the Identity, Utilitarian and Political Approaches to Voting `No']]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>86</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>59</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/87?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The EU Conciliation Committee: One or Several Principals?]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/87?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Since the introduction of the co-decision legislative procedure, the EU has had the                 possibility to resort to a Conciliation Committee made up of representatives from                 the European Parliament and the Council to reconcile differences between the two                 bodies. This article assesses whether the members of this committee have an                 incentive to take advantage of their ability to present take-it-or-leave-it offers                 to their parent bodies by examining whether they are representative of their full                 body and/or whether they represent other interests inside or outside their                 legislative body. It concludes that the EU Conciliation Committee is generally                 representative of its parent bodies and that the option to go to conciliation is not                 a risky tool for them to reach agreement.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rasmussen, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507085958</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The EU Conciliation Committee: One or Several Principals?]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>113</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>87</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/115?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Lost in Translation or Full Steam Ahead: The Transposition of EU Transport Directives across Member States]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/115?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This study supplements extant literature on implementation in the European Union                 (EU). The quantitative analysis, which covers the EU transport acquis, reveals five                 main findings. First, the EU has a transposition deficit in this area, with almost                 70% of all national legal instruments causing problems. Second, transposition delay                 is multifaceted. The results provide strong support for the assertion that                 distinguishing between the outcomes of the transposition process (on time, short                 delay or long delay) is a useful method of investigation. Third, factors specific to                 European directives (level of discretion and transposition deadline) and                 domestic-level factors (national transposition package and number of veto players)                 have different effects on the length of delay. Furthermore, the timing of general                 elections in member states as well as policy (sub)sector-related accidents influence                 the timeliness of national transposition processes.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kaeding, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507085959</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Lost in Translation or Full Steam Ahead: The Transposition of EU Transport Directives across Member States]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>143</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>115</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/1/145?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Analysing the Process of EU Legislative Decision-Making: To Make a Long Story Short...]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/1/145?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Konig, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507085960</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Analysing the Process of EU Legislative Decision-Making: To Make a Long Story Short...]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>165</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>145</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/1/167?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Study of Decision-Making Speed in the European Union: Methods, Data and Theory]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/1/167?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Golub, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507085961</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Study of Decision-Making Speed in the European Union: Methods, Data and Theory]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>179</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>167</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/1/181?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[EUP Referees: March 2006--May 2007]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/1/181?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-14</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116508089461</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[EUP Referees: March 2006--May 2007]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>181</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>181</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/4/451?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Implementing Europe: A Question of Oversight]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/4/451?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article shows that member state governments' ability rather than their willingness to implement directives drives uneven implementation of European Union labor policy. Analysis of 186 labor policy infringement cases against 15 member states between 1978 and 2000 shows that administrative oversight mechanisms that concentrate authority in the hands of government and exclude interest group participation enhance governments' ability to resolve conflicts with the Commission over implementation. Mechanisms that depend on cooperation with interest groups inhibit the resolution of these conflicts. This finding undermines the common prescription that increasing interest group involvement should improve member state governments' implementation of EU laws.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jensen, C. B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-11-07</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507082810</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Implementing Europe: A Question of Oversight]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>8</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>477</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>451</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/4/479?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Analysing Roll Calls of the European Parliament: A Bayesian Application]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/4/479?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article explores the performance of a Bayesian application of spatial voting models to the roll calls of the Fifth European Parliament (EP). Focusing on two distinct voting behaviours of members of the EP (MEPs) &mdash; high absenteeism and the defection from majority alternatives caused by the influence of national parties &mdash; it shows that the Bayesian method is complementary to the standard NOMINATE method. In general, the two methods produce very similar estimates and work as robustness checks for the results from each other. However, the Bayesian method enables us to measure the uncertainty of estimates resulting from the estimation with a large number of missing data and some random-appearing roll calls. In this way, it helps us draw more confident inferences about MEPs' voting behaviour.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Han, J.-H.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-11-07</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507082811</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Analysing Roll Calls of the European Parliament: A Bayesian Application]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>8</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>507</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>479</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/4/509?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Campaign Effects and Second-Order Cycles: A Top-Down Approach to European Parliament Elections]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/4/509?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Second-order elections theory explains cyclical losses by national government parties in elections to the European Parliament (EP) through strategic protest voting owing to performance deficits in policy-making. This paper confronts the conventional bottom-up view with a top-down approach to second-order elections. Ultimately, the electoral cycle is driven not by instrumental voting behaviour but by party strategies oriented towards governmental power in the member states of the European Union. Based on survey data from the European Election Studies of 1999 and 2004, firstorder campaign mobilization is shown to determine the prospects of government parties in second-order elections. Mobilization itself depends on the quality of spatial representation in terms of distinct programmatic alternatives, which governments are unable to provide during the midterm. Although this process can be traced on the left&mdash;right dimension, parties prevent it with regard to integration issues by systematic demobilization. After all, EP elections are still second order, but first-order politics exert their influence through cyclical campaign mobilization and not through strategic protest voting.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Weber, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-11-07</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507082812</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Campaign Effects and Second-Order Cycles: A Top-Down Approach to European Parliament Elections]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>8</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>536</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>509</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/4/537?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Social Choice of EU Treaties: Discrepancies between Voter Preferences and Referendum Outcomes in Denmark]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/4/537?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The article applies Social Choice theory to analyse new and so far undiscovered aspects of the Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 1993. The article queries whether the amended Maastricht Treaty adopted in 1993 was, in fact, the most preferred alternative for a majority of Danish voters. A reconstruction of voter preferences regarding the political alternatives in the European Union &mdash; the Maastricht Treaty, the amended Maastricht Treaty and the Status Quo &mdash; reveals that the amended Maastricht Treaty, despite the fact that it was the Condorcet winner and won the 1993 referendum, may not have been preferred by a majority but was probably the most preferred alternative only for a minority of the electorate.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Justesen, M. K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-11-07</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507082813</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Social Choice of EU Treaties: Discrepancies between Voter Preferences and Referendum Outcomes in Denmark]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>8</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>553</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>537</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/8/4/555?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[How Time Affects EU Decision-Making]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/8/4/555?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Golub, J., Steunenberg, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-11-07</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507082814</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[How Time Affects EU Decision-Making]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>8</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>566</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>555</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/8/4/567?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Temporal Change and the Process of European Union Decision-Making]]></title>
<link>http://eup.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/8/4/567?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zorn, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2007-11-07</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1465116507082815</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Temporal Change and the Process of European Union Decision-Making]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>8</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>576</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2007-12-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>567</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

</rdf:RDF>