European Union Politics recent issues

Social Nation and Social Europe: Support for National and Supranational Welfare Compensation in Europe

Burgoon, B. — Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:04:59 PST

This article investigates citizen support for welfare provisions, where these can be provided at both the national and the EU level. The guiding question is whether welfare provisions at one level dampen, increase or have little effect on support for assistance at the other level. Analysis of data on support for national and EU-level welfare assistance suggests only one-way tension between governance levels: generous national welfare may modestly diminish support for EU-level welfare assistance, as well as the degree to which economic insecurities encourage such support; but the currently meagre EU-level Structural Funds and other transfers have little effect on support for national compensation. This analysis clarifies the possibilities and dilemmas of welfare compensation where governance is multi-level in character.

A Two-Level Analysis of the Determinants of Direct Democratic Choices in European, Immigration and Foreign Policy in Switzerland

Sciarini, P., Tresch, A. — Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:04:59 PST

This article employs a unique data set — covering 25 popular votes on foreign, European and immigration/asylum policy held between 1992 and 2006 in Switzerland — in order to examine the conditional impact of context upon utilitarian, cultural, political and cognitive determinants of individual attitudes toward international openness. Our results reveal clear patterns of cross-level interactions between individual determinants and the project-related context of the vote. Thus, although party cues and political competence have a strong impact on individuals’ support for international openness, this impact is substantially mediated by the type of coalition that is operating within the party elite. Similarly, subjective utilitarian and cultural considerations influence the voters’ decision in interaction with the content of the proposal submitted to the voters as well as with the framing of the voting campaign.

Domestic Politics and European Treaty Reform: Understanding the Dynamics of Governmental Position-Taking

Finke, D. — Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:04:59 PST

This article analyses the extent to which governmental positions on European integration originate from domestic politics. In contrast to previous studies, I apply a longitudinal research design that allows for an empirical analysis of the domestic dynamics that govern position formation. I use advanced statistical measurement techniques to compare national positions across time. Member states’ economic characteristics define a corridor for governmental positions. However, the political dynamics of the domestic arena determine the final position governments adopt at any particular Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). In particular, when formulating the national position, the short-term trend in public opinion limits governmental discretion. This effect is especially strong if the government announced ratification by referendum and in countries with a system of strong parliamentary scrutiny.

Why Don't Veto Players Use Their Power?

Konig, T., Junge, D. — Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:04:59 PST

Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after additional veto players, such as new member states or the European Parliament, have increased the constraints on policy change by legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU)? To answer these questions, this study investigates the voting preferences and logrolling opportunities of the member states on 48 Commission proposals. We find that models that derive the voting preferences from each Commission initiative are scarcely able to explain the consensus in the Council. One reason is that the Commission attempts to avoid a divided Council by initiating proposals for which member states favour a policy change in the same direction. When member states still dispute the size of policy change, we show that they can find a solution by mutually benefiting from logrolling across proposals that either belong to the same policy domain or are negotiated during the same period. Hence, intertemporal and domain-specific logrolling can provide a powerful explanation for consensus even in a contested Council.

Measuring Interest Group Influence Using Quantitative Text Analysis

Kluver, H. — Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:04:59 PST

The analysis of interest group influence is crucial in order to explain policy outcomes and to assess the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. However, owing to methodological difficulties in operationalizing influence, only few have studied it. This article therefore proposes a new approach to the measurement of influence, drawing on quantitative text analysis. By comparing interest groups’ policy positions with the final policy output, one can draw conclusions about the winners and losers of the decision-making process. In order to examine the applicability of text analysis, a case study is presented comparing hand-coding, WORDSCORES and Wordfish. The results correlate highly and text analysis proves to be a powerful tool to measure interest groups’ policy positions, paving the way for the large-scale analysis of interest group influence.

The Sociology of the European Union: An Agenda

Favell, A., Guiraudon, V. — Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:04:59 PST

We seek to shape an agenda for the growing interest in using sociological approaches to study the European Union (EU). In order to deepen and broaden the Europeanization agenda, the article points to how sociology can help reveal the ‘social bases’ of European integration (i.e. processes of European Union), as well as identify effects on European society that might reconnect EU studies with key comparative political economy debates about the European ‘varieties of capitalism’ and its models of economy and society. Unfortunately, however, ‘sociological’ approaches towards the EU have mostly been wrongly equated with the ‘constructivist turn’ in EU studies, and its characteristic preference for ‘soft’ qualitative discursive methods and meta-theory. We argue that, rather than turning to culture, identity or social theory for inspiration, an empirical sociological approach to the EU would reintroduce social structural questions of class, inequality, networks and mobility, as well as link up with existing approaches to public opinion, mobilization and claims-making in the political sociology of the EU. To conclude, the article identifies some exemplary studies along these lines.

Mixing Methods: A Nested Analysis of EU Member State Transposition Patterns

Luetgert, B., Dannwolf, T. — Thu, 13 Aug 2009 00:19:56 PDT

European compliance research has benefited greatly from both quantitative and qualitative studies. Scholars have raised our awareness of potential country, policy sector and Directive-specific compliance patterns, while drawing on very different samples of transposition and infringement data as well as institutional and preference-driven explanations for the observed trends. In our nested analysis of transposition timeliness across nine member states and 1192 directives, we critically assess the fit of our event history model as well as explicit patterns among countryvs. sector-specific trends. We then discuss the relative position of existing case studies within the larger sample based on their deviance and consider the extent to which member state transposition patterns can be generalized or remain individual, Directive-specific phenomena.

The Missing Dimension of Democracy: Institutional Patterns in 25 EU Member States between 1997 and 2006

Vatter, A., Bernauer, J. — Thu, 13 Aug 2009 00:19:56 PDT

By compiling data on 12 politico-institutional variables for 25 member states of the European Union over the years 1997—2006, we were able to investigate the emerging patterns of democracy in the European Union. The study addresses the questions of how direct democracy can be incorporated into Lijphart’s (1999) typology of consensus and majoritarian democracy and how empirical democratic patterns are affected by this extension. For the western democracies, three dimensions of democracy were extracted using principal component analysis, with two resembling those found by Lijphart (1999) and a third one being shaped by the interplay between direct democracy and cabinet type. East European democracies tend to have a lower degree of interest group corporatism, weaker central banks, stronger judicial review and stronger direct democracy.

The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on Attitudes towards the EU

Garry, J., Tilley, J. — Thu, 13 Aug 2009 00:19:56 PDT

Factors relating to identity and to economics have been shown to be important predictors of attitudes towards the European Union (EU). In this article, we show that the impact of identity is conditional on economic context. First, living in a member state that receives relatively high levels of EU funding acts as a ‘buffer’, diluting the impact of an exclusive national identity on Euroscepticism. Second, living in a relatively wealthy member state, with its associated attractiveness for economic migrants, increases the salience of economic xenophobia as a driver of sceptical attitudes. These results highlight the importance of seeing theories of attitude formation (such as economic and identity theories) not as competitors but rather as complementary, with the predictive strength of one theoretical approach (identity) being a function of system-level variation in factors relating to the other theoretical approach (macro-level economic conditions).

Separating the Willing from the Able: Is the European Union's Mediterranean Policy Incentive Compatible?

Bodenstein, T., Furness, M. — Thu, 13 Aug 2009 00:19:56 PDT

The European Union’s ambitious Mediterranean policy has the declared goal of bringing about economic and political transformation by explicitly linking reform with rewards. Drawing on mechanism design theory, we argue that the EU’s Mediterranean policy has the potential to reveal information about the respective partner countries’ reform ‘types’. However, the current incentive structure of the EU’s Mediterranean policy does not fit with the requirements of incentive compatibility, which would allow for screening, because it does not encourage partner countries to reveal the costs of reform. Data on the political and economic reform performance of Mediterranean partner countries reveal the pooling pattern that we would expect from a screening model. By offering two differentiated reward agreements that are not specifically targeted towards each country’s progress on reform, the European Commission could learn which countries are sincere about reforming.

Perspectives on European Immigration Policies

Franchino, F. — Thu, 13 Aug 2009 00:19:56 PDT

Three books studying European immigration from the perspectives of economics, political science and sociology reach different conclusions on some key aspects of this policy. I suggest three avenues for future research. First, there is a need to develop institutionally richer political economy models of migration to examine the conditional nature of state control over immigration. Second, case selection bias in assessing the legacy of immigration for nationality laws should be redressed starting with a more encompassing theory of policy reform. Third, the impact of national welfare policies on the mode of integration of immigrants in the receiving countries could be a promising area of investigation. I illustrate this using employment protection legislation and family policies.

EUP Referees: 1 March 2008--28 February 2009

Thu, 13 Aug 2009 00:19:56 PDT

The Determinants of Direct Corporate Lobbying in the European Union

Bernhagen, P., Mitchell, N. J. — Fri, 15 May 2009 08:03:54 PDT

Whereas research on corporate lobbying in the USA has produced a set of robust findings, less is known about the determinants of business political action in other policy arenas and beyond the nation-state. In particular, we do not know how well the standard profit-seeking model of firm political activity travels. The article examines this issue with an analysis of business lobbying in the EU that reflects tactical adaptation to lobbying at the supranational level. Using data on 2000 large companies, we show that a modified profit-seeking model of corporate political behaviour is generalizable to corporate lobbying in Brussels. By contrast, theories emphasizing nationally distinct types of interest intermediation find little support in the data.

Towards Europeanization of Wage Policy: Germany and the Nordic Countries

Traxler, F., Brandl, B. — Fri, 15 May 2009 08:03:54 PDT

Conventional wisdom regards wage regulation as uncoordinated across Europe. In relation to advanced economic integration, this implies a `suboptimal' wage area, which led to many conjectures about its consequences, ranging from disorganization of collective bargaining to adverse macro-economic effects. This article tests the wage linkages between Germany and the Nordic countries on time series data for the metal industry. The findings show that organized, transnationally coordinated wage policies characterize these countries: Convergence in pay rates results from both economic developments and coordination of transnational bargaining through the pattern-setting role of the German bargainers. These transnational wage policies require the consequences of European integration to be reconsidered for wage regulation and its economic effects.

Is My Crown Better than Your Euro?: Exchange Rates and Public Opinion on the European Single Currency

Binzer Hobolt, S., Leblond, P. — Fri, 15 May 2009 08:03:54 PDT

This article examines the influence of exchange rate fluctuations on public support for the euro. Existing studies of the two euro referendums in Denmark and Sweden have explained the outcomes primarily in terms of static factors, thereby ignoring the fact that support fluctuates over time. This article provides an analysis of the short-term dynamics in public support for the euro in the period leading up to the referendums. We argue that exchange rate fluctuations matter, because people attach symbolic value to their national currency and are less likely to surrender a strong currency. They are also less willing to accept the euro when it is seen as weak vis-à-vis other world currencies. Our case-study and time-series analyses of the two euro campaigns corroborate these propositions.

Does European Integration Lead to a `Presidentialization' of Executive Politics?: Ministerial Selection in Swedish Postwar Cabinets

Back, H., Dumont, P., Meier, H. E., Persson, T., Vernby, K. — Fri, 15 May 2009 08:03:54 PDT

In this article, we address recent claims that executive— legislative relations in parliamentary democracies are undergoing important changes owing to either a `presidentialization' or a `Europeanization' of domestic political systems. Therefore, we test empirically whether parliamentary democracies are indeed experiencing changes in executive—legislative relations and whether these developments can, in part, be explained by an increase in European integration. Using data on ministerial selection in Swedish cabinets during the years 1952—2006, we find that there appears to be a slight tendency towards `presidentialization', which is indicated by a decrease in ministers with a parliamentary background being appointed, and that there exists some support for the notion that Sweden's political and economic integration into the European Union is part of the explanation for this change.

The Rationale behind Committee Assignment in the European Parliament: Distributive, Informational and Partisan Perspectives

Yordanova, N. — Fri, 15 May 2009 08:03:54 PDT

Although most of the legislative tasks of the European Parliament (EP) are performed in its committees, it is controversial how representative they are of the overall plenary. Distributive, informational and partisan theories suggest respectively that the committee assignments system is designed to (1) serve special interests outside the EP, (2) bring informational benefits to the plenary or (3) promote partisan interests. These propositions are examined via a representative sample of committees using an original data set of MEPs' profiles in the 6th European Parliament. The results show that, whereas information-driven committees attract mainly MEPs with relevant expertise, homogeneous special interests influence assignments to interest-driven and mixed committees, turning them into preference outlying committees. However, partisan considerations do not appear to influence individual assignments strategically.

Problems of Operationalization and Data in EU Compliance Research

Hartlapp, M., Falkner, G. — Fri, 15 May 2009 08:03:54 PDT

Substantial theoretical, conceptual and empirical advances have been made in research on the implementation of EU policies during recent years. However, our findings have remained ambivalent and our theoretical insights disparate. It therefore seems high time to address some methodological issues and to raise awareness of the limits of the various approaches and of the data commonly used. We highlight the challenges of operationalizing and of choosing adequate indicators for the dependent variable (compliance). We also discuss the promises and perils of different types of data used in the field, such as official statistics on notifications and infringements published by the European Commission.

Erratum

Thu, 12 Feb 2009 06:50:11 PST

Editorial Note

Schneider, G., Franchino, F., Gabel, M., Hix, S. — Thu, 12 Feb 2009 06:50:11 PST

Just a Lobbyist?: The European Parliament and the Consultation Procedure

Varela, D. — Thu, 12 Feb 2009 06:50:11 PST

The role of the European Parliament (EP) under the consultation procedure has been widely neglected by rational choice models of legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU). This paper offers a new understanding of the procedure by means of a computational model in which lobbyists provide legislators with policy options. Transaction costs of assimilating information lead to rationing of access to the agenda-setter (i.e. the Commission). In this context, consultation converts the EP into an indirect channel to the agenda-setter for some lobbyists. I argue that the resulting pool of policy options, together with the right to be heard by the Commission and the latter's degree of rational ignorance, provides the EP with a legislative power that the literature has not so far recognized. The implications of this finding extend to other legislative procedures of the EU and to consultative committees in other political systems.

The Time-Dependent Effect of Conflict in the Council on Delays in the Transposition of EU Directives

Zhelyazkova, A., Torenvlied, R. — Thu, 12 Feb 2009 06:50:11 PST

This article analyses the effect of conflict in the Council of the European Union (EU) on delays in the transposition of EU directives. Based on enforcement and management theories, we predict that conflict in the Council speeds up the transposition process. In addition, we control for the instigation of infringement procedures by the Commission and expect a weaker effect of conflict in cases where the Commission disagrees with a directive and if directives grant more discretion to member states. These hypotheses are tested using two indicators of conflict: heterogeneity and polarization. Cox regression analysis is applied with time-dependent effects and with a shared frailty to control for the multilevel structure of the data. The analyses show that, over time, conflict has an increasing negative effect on delays.

The Uneven Legal Push for Europe: Questioning Variation when National Courts go to Europe

Wind, M., Martinsen, D. S., Rotger, G. P. — Thu, 12 Feb 2009 06:50:11 PST

National courts have been key players in the legal push for Europe, though notably to varying degrees. This paper examines the persisting variations in the referral rates of national courts and the underlying causal factors, aiming to better understand why some member states' courts have been more reluctant to join in the legal push for Europe. By using econometric methods, it challenges the modified neofunctionalist argument that the extent of intra-EC trade explains the referral practice of the individual member states. Majoritarian democracy is hypothesized as a causal factor in the low referral rates for some of the EU member states. Key characteristics of majoritarian democracy versus constitutional democracy are outlined and the former is further detailed by means of two case studies: Denmark and the UK. Finally, a panel data analysis is conducted and finds evidence of a negative impact of majoritarian democracy on the number of referrals. The paper concludes that, owing to the uneven legal push for Europe, some member states and their citizens remain at arms' length from the legal integration process — and, in consequence, from the full impact of European integration.

Asylum Cooperation among Asymmetric Countries: The Case of the European Union

Czaika, M. — Thu, 12 Feb 2009 06:50:11 PST

This article argues that cooperation to tackle the consequences of large asylum migration inflows is possible only among fairly symmetrical countries. Highly asymmetric countries have no incentives to join and remain in a stable coalition. The distinction between cost and spillover asymmetries shows that financial transfers may release constraints on participation, and thus make asylum cooperation feasible, only if they are focused on tackling this asymmetry. This result becomes relevant when applied to the context of the enlarged European Union. I argue that there is the potential for a future cooperative burden-sharing regime for asylum, particularly if unanimity is replaced by the double majority principle in European Council votes, as suggested in the EU reform treaty.

How Common is the Common External Tariff?: Domestic Influences on European Union Trade Policy

Ehrlich, S. D. — Thu, 12 Feb 2009 06:50:11 PST

This article examines the role of national-level politics and economics on the setting of supranational trade policy within the European Union (EU). It argues that, though EU member states must have a uniform tariff schedule, significant variation remains in the average, trade-weighted tariff because each country has a different bundle of imports into each country. Thus, some countries import more high-tariff goods than others. This article argues that a significant part of this variation is intentional, because countries know which goods they import. Therefore, countries that prefer protection push for tariffs on products they import whereas countries that prefer free trade push for liberalization on products they import, with these preferences being driven by the amount of institutional access provided to interest groups and the economic conditions in the member states. This argument is tested with regression analyses of a panel of average tariff rates in the EU member states and the tariff schedule agreed to by the EU at the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Forum Section: An Automated Database of the European Parliament

Hoyland, B., Sircar, I., Hix, S. — Thu, 12 Feb 2009 06:50:11 PST